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BIG FOOD'S TRIP DOWN TOBACCO ROAD:
WHAT TOBACCO'S PAST CAN INDICATE ABOUT
FOOD'S FUTURE
JOSHUA LOGAN PENNEL
INTRODUCTION
Tobacco's position has been usurped. Cigarette products
are no longer responsible for the greatest share of preventable
illnesses.' Rather, obesity, resulting from a combination of the
"food industry" 2 and the American appetite, now holds the crown
as the most expensive, preventable health care cost. 3 While public
animosity towards the food industry may lag behind animosity
towards the tobacco industry, public attitude has shifted,
demanding tighter control over the food industry. 4 This shift
toward holding fast-food, junk-food, and manufacturers of
unhealthy food products partially responsible for the growing
obesity epidemic is necessary before legislation and judicial action
against the food industry can occur. 5 Indeed, a similar shift in
public opinion helped to tighten regulations on the tobacco
industry and eventually hold it liable for the harms associated with
tobacco use.6
Understanding the history of the tobacco industry allows
for a comparison of where the food industry currently stands, and
" J.D. Candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo, 2010; M.S.,

University of Central Missouri, 2007. Thanks to the Buffalo Public Interest Law
Journal for their editing assistance and comments. Special thanks to Elizabeth
Blazey and Cara Pennel for their tremendous help and continuing support.
1 See Lee J. Munger, Comment, Is Ronald McDonald the Next Joe Camel?
Regulating Fast Food Advertisements That Target Children in Light of the
American Overweight and Obesity Epidemic, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 456, 459

(2004).
2

The "food

industry" collectively refers to the junk-food and fast-food

industries.
3 See Munger, supra note 1.

4 See Forrest Lee Andrews, Comment, Small Bites: Obesity Lawsuits Prepareto
Take on the Fast FoodIndustry, 15 ALB. L.J. SCl. & TECH. 153, 177 (2004).
5 See id.
6

See id.
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where it may be headed in the future. The two industries are
comparable on five main issues. First, parallels between the two
industries' advertising standards show the potential for developing
governmental regulations that, like those in the tobacco industry,
restrict and control the manner in which the food industry may
advertise. 7 Second, the food industry's ethical violations are
similar to ethically questionable actions perpetrated by the tobacco
industry. Third, the health and economic costs of tobacco served as
a catalyst for change in tobacco policy; like tobacco, the rising
health and economic costs related to obesity, which are predicted
to continue to rise in the coming decades, may compel similar food
industry policy reform.8 Fourth, observing the tobacco industry's
past, e.g., ethical violations, advertising policies, legislation, and
litigation, may give insight into the future of public opinion toward
the food industry. Fifth, in response to shifting public opinion, the
food industry may face similar policy, litigation, and legislative
action, as did Big Tobacco. 9 Indeed, some government officials are
calling for the implementation of strategies that will combat the
growing obesity epidemic, borrowing from previous strategies
used to combat tobacco. 10 For example, Governor David Paterson
of New York, drawing from previous tax strategies to decrease
tobacco use, recently proposed
an eighteen percent tax on sugared
11
drinks to help fight obesity.
By focusing on the history of tobacco regulations, one may
gain insight into the future of potential food industry regulations.
Whether the legislature will take similar steps to restrict the
marketing and advertising of food, as it did with tobacco, remains
to be seen. However, by identifying the "sign posts"' 12 along the
7 See Munger, supra note 1, at 466.
8

Id. at 459.
9See Andrews, supra note 4, at 177-8 1.
10 See David Paterson, Commentary, Why We Need an Obesity Tax, CNN, Dec.
18, 2008, www.cnn.com/2008/US/12/18/paterson.obesity/index.html.
1 id
12

See

generally

GENE

BORIO,

TOBACCO

http://www.tobacco.org/resources/history/Tobacco

TIMELINE

ch. 7

(2007),

History20-2.htm I

(discussing how seminal legislation, judicial opinions, and even scientific

2008-2009

Big Food's Trip Down Tobacco Road

path of tobacco regulation and litigation, and by avoiding the
pitfalls that the anti-tobacco movement experienced, the antiobesity movement may make quicker progress towards regulating
the food industry.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF TOBACCO
In the 1950s, tobacco's popularity reached its height. Over
fifty percent of men in the United States smoked cigarettes on a
regular basis, 13 and advertisements still promoted the "healthful
and harmless nature" of smoking cigarettes.14Although scientific
evidence of the link between smoking and lung cancer can be
traced to the early 1900s, tobacco use was still thriving. Despite
tobacco's widespread use, there remained relatively few lawsuits
against the nation's tobacco companies, and the industry
successfully defended against those sporadic attacks. 15 Public
opinion and the legislature still firmly supported tobacco
companies' right to market and capitalize on the popularity of its
product. However, in the 1960s a momentous shift began to
occur.

16

In 1964, the Surgeon General released his first report on the
health effects of smoking. 17 In response to the Surgeon General's
report that linked health problems and smoking, Congress enacted
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 18 and the
studies can show how tobacco changed from a commonly accepted commodity
to a highly regulated drug. Using both the major failures and successes of the
anti-tobacco movement as benchmarks will help to draw parallels between the
tobacco industry and the food industry).
13 BORIO, supra note 12.
14 Leila B. Boulton, Tobacco Under Fire: Developments in Judicial Responses
to CigaretteSmoking Injuries, 36
15 See id. at 646-47.
16

CATH.

U.L. REv. 643, 647 (1987).

See id. at 644-45 (The first federal legislation against the tobacco industry did

not occur until 1965.).
17 BoRio, supra note 12.
18 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat.
282 (1965).
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Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act. 19 These two acts required
cigarettes to
be labeled as harmful, and restricted the marketing of
20
cigarettes.
By the 1970s, cigarette use by the general population had
decreased. 2 1 Thirty-seven percent of the population smoked and
lawsuits became more frequent. 22 Public opinion began to shift as
well. 23 Anti-smoking groups became more prevalent; and, in 1970,
the "Great American Smokeout" was created in Massachusetts to
try to get smokers to give up cigarettes. 24 In addition, President
Richard Nixon signed legislation to further restrict advertising by
banning25 all cigarette advertisements from appearing on broadcast
media.
The 1980s and 1990s brought about new legislation, new
data, and, for the first time, the potential for successful lawsuits
against tobacco manufacturers. 26 In 1983, the first act outlawing
smoking within the workplace passed in San Francisco. 27 The
health effects of smoking, both in terms of the number of deaths
linked to tobacco use and the financial cost of treating tobacco
related illnesses, continued to rise. 28 Within the courts, two
decades of unsuccessful lawsuits brought against tobacco
manufacturers based on breaches of warranty, product liability, and
negligence caused anti-tobacco litigants to change their legal
strategy. 29 Legislation in Florida allowed the state to attempt to
19 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87

(1970).

Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act § 4; Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act §§ 4, 6; Boulton, supra note 14, at 645-46.
21 BORIO, supra note 12.
22 See id.; see Boulton, supra note 14, at 643-44.
23 BORIO, supra note 12.
20Federal

24 [d.
25

Id.

26

See id

27 Id.

See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
OF SMOKING: CANCER: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1982), available
at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/B/C/D/W/ /nnbcdw.pdf.
29 See Boulton, supra note 14, at 644 n.4.
28
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recoup its Medicare costs by applying a market share principle and
allowing for joint and several liability. 30 Eventually, the tobacco
industry capitulated and settled with multiple states, paying
31
billions of dollars to cover the costs of tobacco related illnesses.
FOOD AND TOBACCO: PARALLEL PATHS
Today, anti-obesity campaigns against the food industry are
experiencing many of the same roadblocks that anti-tobacco
advocates faced in the 1960s. In order for litigation and legislation
against the food industry to be successful, the public's attitude
towards obesity must shift. 32 The following belief is still prevalent
in society: "anyone with an IQ higher than room temperature...
understand[s] that excessive consumption of food served in fastfood restaurants will lead to weight gain .... 33
Like tobacco, the anti-obesity movement faces strong
opposition from those who believe that being overweight is a
matter of personal choice. 34 This viewpoint tends to "blame
individuals for getting fat.' , 35 Similarly, in the 1970s, lung cancer
was thought to be a direct result of people's inability - their lack of
willpower - to stop smoking, just as an obese individual's weight
is thought to be a result of his or her personal choice to eat
unhealthily. 36 However, a growing attitude has emerged that
begins to look past personal responsibility and instead focuses the
30

Scott Richardson, Comment, Attorney General's Warning: Legislation May

Now be Hazardous to Tobacco Companies' Health, 28 AKRON L. REV. 291,
292-93 (1995).
31 See Eric A. Posner, Tobacco Regulation or Litigation?: Smoke-Filled Rooms,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1141, 1141 (2003).
32 See Andrews, supra note 4, at 181.
33 Brooke Courtney, Is Obesity Really the Next Tobacco? Lessons Learnedfrom
Tobaccofor Obesity Litigation, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 61, 104 (2006).
34 [d. at 226.

35 Rogan Kersh & James A. Morone, Obesity, Courts, and the New Politics of

Public Health, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 839, 846 (2005).
36 See Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 872 So. 2d 101, 120 (Ala.
2003) (Johnstone, J., dissenting); Courtney, supra note 33, at 104.
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personal responsibility aspect of obesity, and focus on the cultural,
37
corporate, socioeconomic, and environmental causes of obesity.
As societal perceptions change and the known causes of obesity
expand to become more comprehensive, the public's desire to see
governmental action against the food industry may grow.
It is "the social and political processes [that] usually pull
the government and its statutory framework[,] rather than
government pushing society. ' 38 Just as with tobacco in the 1970s
and 1980s, 39 a shift in public attitude towards the food industry
may make action by judges and politicians politically safe. Further,
a fundamental shift in the attitude of the public has been credited
with making the tobacco industry more amenable to lawsuit
settlements. 40 The Master Settlement Agreement ("MSA"), which
cost Big Tobacco billions of dollars and set strict marketing and
advertising standards, was made at a time when the shift in attitude
was making it harder for the tobacco industry to fend off attacks,
i.e., multiple class action lawsuits. 4 1 In many ways Big Tobacco's
acceptance of the MSA was "prescient rather than foolish., 42 The
MSA sought to discourage further litigation and afforded tobacco
companies the protection that they desperately needed to avoid
bankruptcy and the loss of market share. 43 In return, tobacco
companies 44
agreed to pay states and operate under new regulatory
constraints.
Like tobacco in the 1950s, the food industry seems to have
overwhelming support from the public, the legislature, and the
37 Courtney, supra note 33, at 69.
38

David J. Malcolm, Tobacco, Global Public Health, and Non-Governmental

Organizations: An Eminent Pandemic or Just Another Legal Product?, 28
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 14 (1999).
39Id. at 31.
40 See Shital A. Patel, The Tobacco Litigation Merry-Go-Round. Did
the MSA
Make it Stop?, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 615, 625-26 (2005).
41 See id. at 634-35.
42 Posner, supra note 31, at 1144.
43 Patel, supra note 40, at 615, 626.
44 Id. at 626.
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judiciary. 45 A vast majority of the United States population does
not currently support litigation against fast-food.4 6 In at least
fourteen states the legislature has passed "Cheeseburger Bills" that
protect the fast-food industry from obesity-related lawsuits. 47 It
would appear that the fast-food industry is relatively safe from
lawsuit and regulation. But, as with the tobacco industry in the
1980s, public opinion may shift as further research on the effects
of obesity and its costs saturate the public sphere.
INDUSTRY STANDARDS IN ADVERTISING
Advertising directed at children may have been one of the
lynchpins for the shift in public opinion regarding tobacco; such
advertising practices highlighted the unethical tactics of the
tobacco industry. In the 1990s, while the youth smoking rates
increased, R. J. Reynolds, the producer of Camel Cigarettes,
continued to use Joe Camel to advertise its cigarettes. 4 8 Many
people believed that these youth-targeted tobacco advertisements
bore responsibility for the "approximately thirty-five percent of
youth [who] were smokers .... ,49 Many advocates for smoking

regulations pointed to R.J. Reynolds's market share of youth
smokers as proof of the affect advertisements have on smokers
under eighteen years of age. 50 Before Joe Camel became the
mascot of Camel cigarettes, R.J. Reynolds had less than one
percent of the youth market smoking its brand of cigarettes. 51 Five
years into its marketing campaign this percentage skyrocketed to
thirteen percent. 52 In total, the three companies that spent the most
45 See Munger, supra note 1, at 460-61, 477; see Symposium, The Mass Media's
Influence on Health Law and Policy, 5 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 175, 183

(2005).
46 Munger, supra note 1, at 462-63.
47 Symposium, supra note 45, at 183 n.37.
48
1 d.at 632-33.
49

50

See id.at 619.
[d. at 632-33.

51Id.
52

id.

at 633.
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money on advertising controlled eighty-five percent of the total
youth market. 53 In reaction, a significant portion of the MSA was
designed to ensure that the tobacco industry would not "take any
action, the primary purpose of which [was] to initiate, maintain[,]
or increase youth smoking."5 4 This included
the use of any
55
advertisements.
in
or
packaging
cartoons on
Not only was the tobacco industry derided for taking
advantage of "susceptible" youth, the tobacco industry's practice
of directing advertising at children was seen as an intolerable
interference with parental authority. 56 At a minimum, parents have
a duty to express "personal concern over the health, education[,]
and general welfare of

. .

. [their] child., 57 Many felt that the

tobacco industry violated parents' rights to perform this duty by
targeting its advertisements at children. 58 The interests of parents
"ought to include the power to protect children from seductive
cartoon characters peddling an addictive product that is illegal for
children to buy." 59 The fact that ninety percent of all smokers
begin smoking before the age of twenty lends considerable weight
to the claim that the tobacco
industry's advertisements directly
60
challenge parents' rights.
Today, the food industry spends over $11 billion annually
on advertising directed at children and an additional $22 billion on

53 Id.
54 Patel, supra note 40, at 628.

55Id.
Donald W. Garner & Richard J. Whitney, Protecting Children From Joe
Camel and His Friends: A New First Amendment and Federal Preemption
Analysis of Tobacco BillboardRegulation, 46 EMORY L.J. 479, 510 (1997).
57 Conley v. Walden, 533 P.2d 955, 959 (Mont. 1975).
51See Garner and Whitney, supra note 56, at 511.
59
Id.at 512.
60 See id.at 533(quoting Alan Blum & Matt Myers, Tobacco Marketing and
56

Promotion in TOBACCO USE: AN AMERICAN CRISIS: FINAL CONFERENCE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM AMERICA'S HEALTH COMMUNITY 63,

66-67
(Thomas
P.
Houston
ed.,
http://legacy. library.ucsf.edu/tid/gdpO2aOO/pdf).

1993),

available

at
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"consumer promotions.' 6 1 With a combined total of over $30
billion, the food industry spends more on marketing than any other
industry. 62 Product placement, synergistic marketing between
movies and food, websites, toys, books, video games, theme parks,
and music all contribute to the onslaught of marketing ploys
63
designed to increase a food company's youth share of the market.
Eight in ten adults agree that "business marketing and advertising
exploit children by convincing64 them to buy things that are bad for
them or that they don't need.,
Reminiscent of Joe Camel, another fictional marketing
character that made inroads with youth consumers, Ronald
McDonald is as identifiable to elementary school children as
Mickey Mouse, and second only to Santa Claus as the most
recognized
fictional
character. 6 5 McDonald's
corporation
accurately touts its character as "the smile known around the
world., 66 Similarly, at the height of the R.J. Reynolds' Joe Camel
advertising campaign, school children could recognize "Old Joe"
as readily as Mickey Mouse. 67 Since children are more influenced
by tobacco advertising than adults, Joe Camel and other iconic
marketing characters instilled product recognition and brand
loyalty for a generation of consumers. 68 Indeed, while adult
smokers based their purchasing decision on, among other factors,
price, smokers under the age of eighteen tended to display brand
loyalty by purchasing the three most heavily advertised cigarette
61

Cheryl L. Hayne et al., Regulating Environments to Reduce Obesity, 25 J.

PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 391, 395 (2004).
62Courtney, supra note 33, at 70.
6

,

See id. at 70-71.

64 Hayne et al., supra note 61, at 394 (quoting Tom McGee & Kevin Heubusch,
Getting Inside Kids'Heads, 19 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS 52 (1997)).
65Munger, supra note 1, at 467; see also Sarah Avery, Is Big Fat the Next Big
Tobacco?, NEWS & OBSERVER, Aug. 18, 2002, at A25.

66

McDonald's

Company

History,

http://www.mcdonalds.com/usa/work/

companyhistory.printfriend.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2009).
67 Jef I. Richards, Politicizing Cigarette Advertisements, 45 CATH. U.L. REV.
1147, 1154 (1996).
68See Courtney, supra note 33, at 82.
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brands. 69 However, after decades of successfully avoiding liability,
cigarette manufacturer, such as R.J. Reynolds, eventually realized
that anti-smoking advocates were destined to succeed;
consequently, R.J. Reynolds discontinued the use of Joe Camel and
"self-regulated" its advertising by only targeting smokers of legal
age. 70 Although, the cigarette industry may have decided to
regulate itself in an attempt to avoid formal governmentally
imposed regulation of its advertising, the public's 71
shifting
perceptions ultimately resulted in government intervention.
In recent years, large companies have voluntarily agreed to
restrict food advertisements directed at youth for products that
meet a certain nutritional standard.72 In 2006, Disney became one
of the first large corporations to voluntarily reduce or eliminate the
advertising and marketing of food based on "how much sugar,
calories and fat could be in snacks and foods .

.

.

73 Parents'

rights groups and anti-obesity advocates hailed the move as a
direct reaction to the "increasingly vocal debate over what parents
want their children to eat and what the food companies are trying
to sell to them." 74 Disney began to disallow its popular characters
to appear on packaging in which the "total fat exceeds 30 percent
of calories for main and side dishes and 35 percent for snacks,
saturated fat exceeds 10 percent of calories for main dishes and
snacks, and added sugar exceeds 10 percent of calories for main
dishes and 25 percent for snacks." 75 Disney further vowed to

69
70

See id. at 82-83.

Munger, supra note 1, at 468 (citing William Booth, California Sends Joe

Camel to an EarlierRetirement, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1997, at A 10).
71 See, e.g., Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Dramatic
Changes in Public

Perception

Stimulate

Tobacco

Regulation,

grr/02635 1.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2009).

http://www.rwjf.org/reports/

See, e.g., Landon Thomas Jr., Disney Says It Will Link Marketing to Nutrition,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at Cl.
72

73 Id.
74 id.
75 id.
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"reject as sponsors any kinds of food not meeting specific health
guidelines" from its programming on the Disney Channel.76
Following Disney's example, a dozen other companies
began to restrict or eliminate the advertising of unhealthy food
directed
at
children under
twelve
during
"children's
77
programming. "
General Mills, PepsiCo, McDonald's, and
Hershey are a few of the large corporations that have voluntarily
agreed to eliminate certain types of advertising during select
programs. 78 In total, the "companies involved [in this self-imposed
ban,] represent two-thirds of the total children's advertising
market . . . ."79 While the corporations have touted the move as
corporate responsibility, critics have cited the numerous loopholes
that exist within these self-imposed regulations, and highlight the
threats of lawsuits and regulatory intervention as the driving force
behind these "self-regulat[ions]. "8 What may appear to be "good
for business," changes in the company's behavior may in fact be a
corporation's attempt to stave off harsher regulations and satiate
the growing
desire of the general public for real and fundamental
81
change.
Critics question whether the voluntary restrictions will have
the desired effect. 82 They have complained that the lack of uniform
standards amongst the companies and also the companies'
definition of "children's programming," will give the corporations
too much flexibility. 83 For example, companies limit their
advertisements during "SpongeBob SquarePants," which is viewed
by an average audience of 876,000 children from the age of six to
76

William Triplett, Disney Tackles Childhood Obesity: Food Industry Pledges

to Stop Targeting Kids, VARIETY, July 18, 2007, http://www.variety.com/article/
VRI I 17968779.html?categoryid- 1236&cs-1.
77 Brooks Barnes, Limiting Ads of Junk Food to Children, N.Y. TIMES, July, 18,
2007, at C1.
78 Id
79 Id

80 [d
81 See
82 See
83 id.

id
id.
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eleven years old, but allows advertisements to be shown during an
episode of American Idol, which attracts 2.1 million children from
that same age group. 84 This allows companies to maintain that they
are no longer directly advertising to youth under the age of twelve,
while still having their products routinely shown to that age group.
Further, while a company like General Mills may stop advertising
its popular cereal "Trix" during select programming because it
contains thirteen grams of sugar per serving, it will continue to
promote "Coco Puffs" because the product's sugar content meets
the company defined standard of only having twelve grams of
sugar per serving. 85 By establishing arbitrary standards and weak
self-regulations, the food industry can mount a defense against
criticisms while, in actuality, making few changes to its advertising
practices. While these "slight-of-hand" approaches may not
significantly impact the unhealthy eating habits of children, they
demonstrate the pressure that large corporations face under
mounting public pressure.
ETHICAL VIOLATIONS AND THE CALL FOR CHANGE
The addictive and harmful nature of cigarettes, and the
manner in which the tobacco industry concealed this fact, added to
the perceived ethical violations of Big Tobacco. 86 Tobacco
companies also conducted research and assigned its "legal
counsel" to supervise the studies. 87 This practice allowed "bad
findings [to] be held back as lawyer-client confidences, whereas
good findings could be described as the product of scientific
inquiry." 88 This allowed damaging reports to be withheld from the
public and allowed the "scientific research that was most favorable

84

[d.

85

Id.
See Michael V. Ciresi et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the

86

Minnesota
Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 477, 500-01 (1999).
87
See id. at 500.
88

Id.at 500-01.
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to [the industry's] position" to be publicized. 8 9 The discovery of
these tactics affected the tobacco industry in two ways: first, it
opened the industry to successful lawsuits, and second, it severely
damaged public opinion; no longer was it enough to say that
smokers knew the health hazards of smoking. 90 Smokers lacked a
significant amount of information, largely because the tobacco
91
industry desperately tried to keep consumers from knowing.
While it is true that "solid, scientific evidence that fast-food
is an addiction driving the nation to obesity has not been
produced, ' ,92 as it eventually was in the case of tobacco, "ethical
violations" have already served as the basis for successful lawsuits
against the food industry and have affected public perception. For
example, McDonald's failed to report the use of beef fat in the
cooking of its fries, which cost it $12 million in a lawsuit
settlement. 93 Regulatory agencies have also fined companies like
Kraft and Pirate's Booty for using deflated fat grams on their
nutritional labels. 94 While these ethical violations may simply be
isolated incidences involving mistakes, or the actions of less
scrupulous companies, they may also be the beginning of a mass
uncovering of industry-wide practices. Prior to 2002, the food
industry liberally applied the label "organic" to the food packages
it produced. 95 However, in 2002, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture began regulating the packaging of food in reaction to
'9 Bruce A. Green, Thoughts About Corporate Lawyers After Reading the
Cigarette Papers: Has the "Wise Counselor" Given Way to the "HiredGun "?,
51 DEPAUL L. REV. 407, 425 (2001).
90 See generally Ciresi et al., supra note 86, at 478-80.
91See Green, supra note 89, at 414-16.
92 Munger, supra note 1, at 477-78 (citing Donald W. Garner & Richard J.
Whitney, Protecting Children From Joe Camel and His Friends: A New First
Amendment and FederalPreemption Analysis of Tobacco BillboardRegulation,
46 EMORY L.J. 479, 510 (1997)).
9' Kate Zernike, Lawyers Shift Focus from Big Tobacco to Big Food, N.Y.
TIMES,
9
4

Apr. 9, 2004, at A15.

[d.

95 See Andrew J. Nicholas, Comment, As the Organic Food Industry Gets Its
House in Order, the Time Has Come for National Standards for Genetically
Modified Foods, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 277, 277 (2003).

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXVII

the misleading practices of certain companies. 9 6 Today, the food
industry is allowed to apply the word "healthy" without regulation,
and the flexibility in current food labeling regulations on serving
sizes allows companies to adjust serving portions in order to fall
within defined categories, e.g. "low fat.",9 7 These labels are then
placed on food packaging, 98 completing a deception completely
within the current standards.
THE

HEALTH

AND

ECONOMIC

COSTS

OF

AN

INDUSTRY
TOBACCO

The magnitude of the health problems associated with
tobacco became so large that the public and elected officials found
it difficult to ignore the health costs of smoking. In 1964, the
Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health
released its first official report, which concluded that cigarettes
were dangerous and that there was an increased risk of cancer from
smoking. 99 The 1960s also brought about the labeling of cigarettes
with the now familiar Surgeon General's warning, the removal of
cigarette advertisements from broadcast media, and the annual
tracking of the health effects of tobacco use. 10 0 The Advisory
Committee and public health agencies uncovered additional health
risks, i.e., heart disease, stroke, and chronic bronchitis with the
release of subsequent reports. 1 1 By the time that prenatal dangers
96

See id. at 287.
97 See Sarah A. Key, What Businesses Need to Know About FDA's Plan to
Combat
Obesity,
15
WASH.
LEGAL
FOUND, Jan.
28,
2005,

http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/what%/o20businesses%/o20need%/o2 0to%/o201mo
w.pdf.
98 Id.
99 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Smoking & Tobacco Use,
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data-statistics/sgr/history/index.htm (last visited
Apr. 27, 2009).
100 Id.

101Id.
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and second-hand smoke became publically recognized risks, the
number of deaths attributed annually to smoking and tobacco
exceeded 400,000 per year.102
In addition to the direct health effects of tobacco, the
indirect economic burden ballooned as well. 10 3 Eventually, "states
that wanted to [hold] tobacco companies ... liable for state health
care and Medicaid costs" 104 succeeded in holding the tobacco

industry liable for its products. Each year, individuals, states, and
insurance companies spend $75 billion dollars on medical
expenditures for tobacco-related illnesses and businesses lose an
estimated $92 billion due to fallen productivity, all because of
smoking related illnesses. 10 5 These staggering numbers eventually
helped to shift public opinion106 enough so that legislatures took
action to regulate the industry.
OBESITY

Like tobacco throughout the late 1900s, obesity has been
steadily increasing over the past decades and is poised to become
10 7
the leading cause of preventable death in the United States.
According to the U.S. Department of Health, sixty-one percent of
adults in America are overweight. 108 One-third of all adults in this
country are at or above the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention's threshold for obesity, by having a Body Mass Index

102 Id.
103

CDC

Foundation,

Focus

on

Tobacco,

http://www.cdcfoundation.org/

programs/FocusOnTobacco.aspx (last visited Apr. 27, 2009).
104 Benjamin J. Wolf, Comment, "Can You Hear Me Now?": Cellular Phones
and Mass Tort Litigation After Newman v. Motorola, Inc., 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 267, 305 (2003).
105 CDC Foundation, supra note
103.
106 See e.g., Richards, supra note
67.
107 See Alyse Meislik, Comment, Weighing in on the Scales of Justice: The
Obesity Epidemic and Litigation Against the Food Industry, 46 ARIZ. L. REV.
781, 784 (2004).
108

Munger, supra 1, at 459.
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exceeding thirty. 10 9 The occurrence of obesity has been steadily
rising; Colorado is currently the only state where less than twenty
percent of its population qualifies as obese. 110
Three states
currently have an obesity rate that exceeds thirty percent. III
Nearly every facet of America is affected by obesity. Vast
numbers of people have friends, family, neighbors, and/or coworkers who suffer from this growing epidemic. Children are also
gaining weight at an alarming rate. 112 This weight gain not only
affects individuals, but could also threaten the future workforce
and the health of the next generation. Overweight children and
adolescents are more likely to become obese adults." 3 The health
problems from which these obese adults will suffer are a danger to
the stability and long-term growth of the economy. 114 Without a
healthy and productive population, America will be less
competitive in the global market. 115
However, obesity and the threat it presents is not just a
problem for future generations; Americans already face economic
difficulties from increased health insurance premiums, lost

'09 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Overweight and Obesity:
Introduction, http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/index.htm (last visited
Apr. 29, 2009) (The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention calculates body
mass index as a ratio between a person's height and weight. It is considered a
"reliable indicator of body fatness for people."). Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Healthy Weight, http://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/assessing/
bmi/adult bmi/index.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
110 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Overweight and Obesity:
Obesity
Trends,
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/trend/maps/
index.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
III Id.
112 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Health Topics: Nutrition,

http://www.cdc.gov/healthyYouth/nutrition/facts.htm

(last

visited Apr.

29,

2009).
113 Id.
114 Kathryn Hinton, comment, Employer by Name, Insurer by Trade: Society's
Obesity Epidemic and Its Effects on Employers' Healthcare Costs, 12 CONN.
INS. L.J. 137, 138 (2006).
115
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productivity, and higher taxes. 116 Those individuals who maintain a
healthy weight are less of a strain on the U.S. health system. 117 The
effect of obesity is costing Americans money and as the trend
increases so will the cost. Health care costs associated with obesity
are now more expensive than any other preventable illness,
including tobacco. 118 In economic terms, treatment related to
patients who are overweight and obese exceeded $78 billion in
1998.119 Well over half, $47 billion, of these health care
expenditures resulted from the treatment of obese patients and the
plethora of health-related problems that accompany obesity. 120 As
the number of obese individuals has increased, so to have the costs
associated with treating them. 12 1 In 2002, the dollar amount
associated with health care for overweight and obese people
exceeded $117 billion. 122 During this year, the economic cost of
treating obesity surpassed the cost of treating tobacco-related
illness for the first time. 123 With one-third of all children projected
to develop diabetes, 124 health care costs will become an even
bigger burden on the next generation. Solving the problem now by

116See generally Glenna Novack, Note, Lawsuits in the Fast-FoodNation: Will

Fast-Food Suits Succeed as Obesity Becomes an American Tradition?, 52
WAYNE L. REv. 1307, 1307 (2006).
117See generally id.
118 Munger, supra note 1, at 459.
119Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Overweight and Obesity:
Economic
Consequences,
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/
economic consequences.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2009) (citing numbers from
the National Health Accounts); Eric A. Finkelstein et al., National Medical
Spending Attributable to Overweight and Obesity: How Much, and Who's
Paying?, HEALTH AFFAIRS, May 14, 2003,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/

index.dtl (search "Quick Search: Author" for "Finkelstein"; then check article
and "download to citation manager").
120 Finkelstein et al., supra note 119.
121See generally Munger, supra note 1, at 459.
122

Id.

123 Id.

124

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Health Topics: Nutrition,

http://www.cdc.gov/healthyYouth/nutrition/facts.htm (last visited May 1, 2009).
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reducing the number of youth that are destined to become obese
adults should be a pressing concern in this country.
Despite U.S. goals to reduce childhood obesity, the rate of
overweight children in the U.S. nearly tripled in each age category
from the latter half of the 1970s to 2003.125 These numbers show
that the U.S. government's goal of reducing the number of
overweight children to five percent by 2010 is far from being
accomplished. 126 Youth who are overweight not only suffer from
social problems, such as low-self esteem and social stigmatization;
they also commonly suffer from sleep apnea and problems with
their bones and joints. 127 Further exacerbating the health concerns
associated with being overweight or obese, "an estimated [sixtyone] percent of obese young people have at least one additional
risk factor for heart disease, such as high cholesterol or high blood
pressure."'128 The startling statistics concerning obesity, particularly
those pertaining to obese youth, may diminish public opinion
toward the food industry in a manner similar to the public opinion
downfall seen towards tobacco.
A CRISIS OF HEALTH AND THE SHIFT IN PUBLIC
OPINION
The rise in both premature deaths and the financial cost of
obesity may spotlight the need for legislative action directed at the
food industry. As tobacco before, the rise in obesity-related deaths
and the economic cost of obesity may make the public much more
willing to change its opinions. By the 1990s, public opinion shifted
away from the strict view that tobacco users were responsible for
125

Id. (discussing that rates in the two to five year old group increased from 5 %

to 13.9%, six to eleven year old group increased from 4 % to 18.8%, and twelve
to nineteen year old group increased from 6 .1% to 17.4%).
126 HEALTHY PEOPLE, MIDCOURSE REVIEW: HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010 4-5, 15,
http://www.healthypeople.gov/Data/midcourse/pdf/fal9.pdf.
127Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention, Health Topics: Childhood

Obesity, http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/obesity/index.htm (last visited May
1,2009).
128 Id.
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the illnesses that they suffered. 129 Instead, due to the magnitude of
the health crisis and the deceitful manner in which the tobacco
industry had been operating, the industry became the focal point of
populist anger towards the health epidemic. 130 It was not until
1995 that the White House viewed the fight against tobacco as "a
political winner." 131 With the anti-smoking sentiment "squarely in
the cultural mainstream,"' 132 President Clinton felt that it was
politically safe to begin pushing for legislation. In some ways, the
White House even "gain[ed]
points for picking a fight with an
33
industry."1
unpopular
Similarly, public attitude may make legislative action
against the food industry politically safe. Public awareness of the
overweight/obesity epidemic has grown in the past decade. In the
final quarter of 1999, fewer than a dozen stories on obesity-related
public policy appeared in major U.S. publications. 134 The courts
had only recently agreed to the MSA settlement with the tobacco
industry, which was the culmination of decades of work and
fundamental shifts in the public perception of the tobacco-induced
public health crisis. 135 Tobacco litigation resulted from numerous
changes in the legislative and judicial levels of government, as
well as changes in the public's perception of tobacco use and the
tobacco industry. 136 In 2001, the Surgeon General issued the first
official report on obesity. 137 This report, highlighting the
remarkable increase in obese individuals in the U.S., attempted to
develop the first national action plan to combat the growing
129See

generally Ciresi et al., supra note 86, at 522.

10 See Richards, supra note 67, at 1176-77.
131Id. at
132

1177 n. 128.

Id.

133 Id.

134

Kersh & Morone, supra note 35, at 842.
supra note 40, at 625.

135Patel,
136

Id. at 621-22.

See generally UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, THE SURGEON GENERAL'S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND
DECREASE
OVERWEIGHT
AND
OBESITY
2001
(2001),
137

http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/calltoaction/CalltoAction.pdf.
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obesity epidemic. 138 As a result of the Surgeon General's report,
the number of articles on obesity increased a thousand-fold, with
more than 1,200 articles published by the final quarter of 2002.139
Continuing to the present, obesity still receives a great amount of
attention as a public 140
health topic and, as a result, the push for
too.
grown
has
action
LEGISLATIVE AND LITIGATIVE SOLUTIONS
According to the New York Times, the Government's
taxation of cigarettes was the "biggest health care breakthrough in
the last [forty] years . .,,141
For every ten percent increase in the
price of cigarettes, sales are reduced by approximately three
percent. 142 This figure more than doubles to seven percent within
the teenage smoking population. 143 Assuming these figures to be
accurate, then "the 1983 increase in the federal tax on cigarettes
[alone] saved 40,000 lives per year."' 144 These federal taxes, along
with state imposed cigarette taxes, which have grown significantly,
from Iowa's two cent tax in the 1920s 145 to New York's $2.75 tax
in 2008,146 have dramatically increased the number of lives saved.
New York State's Governor David Paterson proposed the
147
implementation of a tax on sugared drinks for New York State.
Any drink that is non-diet, including fruit juice that is less than
seventy percent juice, would be subjected to an eighteen percent
tax. 148 While Governor Paterson has stated that this would raise
138

Id. at V.

139 Kersh

140

& Morone, supra note 35, at 842.

Id. at 843.

141Nicholas

D. Kristof, Miracle Tax Diet, N.Y.

TIMES,

Dec. 18, 2008, at A43.

142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.

145 BORIO,
146

supra note 12.
Valerie Bauman, NY Health Officials: Higher Tax Helps Smokers Quit,

ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, June 15, 2008.
147 Paterson, supra note 10.
148 I,,_
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more than $400 million in extra tax revenue, he also predicts that
this tax would reduce the amount of soda and other non-diet drinks
consumed by five percent. 149 When attempting to extol the virtues
of this tax, Governor Paterson directly compared the "obesity tax"
to the taxes that the government placed on cigarettes.' 50 He states
that the taxes on cigarettes are responsible for preventing "more
than 243,000 kids from smoking, sav[ing] more than 37,000 lives
151
and produc[ing] more than $5 billion in health care savings."
Hoping to see a similar effect from the "obesity tax," Governor
Paterson admits that the tax will be unpopular and face initial
opposition. 152 However, he notes that raises in cigarette taxes are,
and continue to be, unpopular in some sections of the
population. 153 The cigarette tax's affect is however "undeniable...
for the first time in generations, fewer than [twenty] percent of
Americans smoke ....

154 Hopefully, "Uj]ust as the cigarette tax

has helped reduce the number of smokers and smoking-related
deaths, a tax on highly caloric, non-nutritional
beverages can help
155
reduce the prevalence of obesity."
The food industry has already had direct litigation brought
against them. 156 In Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., a group of
overweight teenagers sued McDonald's, asserting that the
company's practices and marketing were deceptive and caused
them to injure their health by becoming obese. 157 The plaintiffs
contended, in part, that McDonald's advertising made it seem
possible to consume McDonalds' products on a daily basis without
any adverse health consequences. 158 The case was eventually
Id.
Id.
151 Id.
149

150

152

See

153 See

id.
id.

154 Id.

155Id.

See generally Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
156

157
158

Id. at 516.
Id. at 527-28.
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dismissed after numerous re-filings.' 5 9 Portions of McDonald's
160
successful defense have direct ties to past tobacco defenses.
Quoting the Second Restatement of Torts, McDonald's highlights
161
a section that discusses unreasonably dangerous products.
"Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because.., it
deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks; but
bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably
dangerous." ' 162 Interestingly, McDonald's chose to use this portion
of the passage but neglected to include the preceding sentence of
the Restatement which stated, "[g]ood tobacco is not unreasonably
dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful;
but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be
unreasonably dangerous."' 163 The judge in Pelman points out that
the "good tobacco" example was likely excluded "because the
authors of the Restatement, writing in the 1960s, did not envision
the successful tobacco litigation and settlements of the 1990s." 164
McDonald's statement may contain a bit of irony if, in the future,
courts determine, as they did with tobacco, that the harmful effects
of the product in questions can contribute to judgments in favor of
plaintiffs. Will Pelman qualify as the beginning point of litigation
against the food industry? Tobacco too had numerous unsuccessful
lawsuits brought against it from the 1950s to the mid 1990s. 165
The food industry is beginning to see regulations that
restrict the manner in which it can advertise, package its products,
and make claims. 166 In the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. government
required tobacco companies to apply a warning to their packaging
159See

Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 396 F.3d 508, 510, 512 (2d Cir. 2005).
F. Supp. 2d at 531-32.

160Pelman, 237
161Id.
162 Id.
16

3Id. at 531.

164

Id. at 532 n. 18.

165 Id.

166See Krista Hessler Carver, Analyzing the Laws, Regulations, and Policies

Affecting FDA-Regulated Products: A Global View of the First Amendment
Constraintson FDA, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 154 (2008).
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and remove cigarette advertisements from broadcast media. 167 In
1965, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
("FCLAA") established "a comprehensive Federal Program to deal
with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any
relationship between smoking and health."' 168 The FCLAA also
required cigarette companies to list the ingredients that are in their
products. 169 The food industry has many of the same requirements
attached to the manner in which it may advertise and package its
food. The Food and Drug Administration regulates the terminology
that the food industry places on its packaging and requires that
nutritional information be listed. 170 Further, actions may be called
for and might parallel some of the restrictions that were placed on
tobacco products.
In 1978, the government proposed the regulation of
advertising as directed at children. 17 1 That year, the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") attempted to ban all advertisements directed
at children under the age of seven. 172 Even though scientific
studies showed that children who watched television programs
"could not delineate between television programming and
commercials," 173 "big business" immediately opposed the FTC's
proposed ban. Congress, spurred by heavy lobbying from the food
industry, legislatively barred the FTC from being able to regulate
non-misleading advertisements directed at children. This ban is
still in effect today. 174 While the FTC may regulate false
advertising, the ban continues to restrict it from regulating any
167 See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79

Stat. 282 (1965); Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970); see also Boulton, supra note 14, at 645-46.
168 Kathleen M. Paralusz, Ashes to Ashes: Why FDA Regulation of Tobacco
Advertising May Mark the End of the Roadfor the MarlboroMan, 24 AM. J. L.
& MED. 89, 99 (1998) (citing Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965)).
169 Id.

170 See generally Carver, supra note 166.
171 Munger, supra note 1, at 475.
172 Id.

173Id.

174

Id. at 475-76.
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other type of advertisement directed at children.' v It is no
coincidence that the increase in advertisements directed at children
began to gradually increase
after the congressional ban on
176

regulation went into effect.

Many of the arguments that will likely be put forth by the
food industry against regulating advertising will be similar to those
used by the tobacco industry. "Speech that is regulated based
solely on its content is generally given the most First Amendment
protection."' 17 7 However, this has not always applied to commercial
speech. 178 Not until Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporationv.
Public Service Commission ("Central Hudson") in 1980, did the
Supreme Court determined that the state's interest to restrict
commercial speech had to pass intermediate scrutiny. 179 While
asserting that the economic interest denied commercial speech the
strict scrutiny afforded other manners of speech, the Supreme
Court did recognize that some protection of speech was
necessary. 18 ° Commercial speech "not only serves the economic
interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the
societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of
information."' 18 CentralHudson developed a four part test that the
182
state must satisfy in order for a regulation to be constitutional.
First, the activity must be misleading or related to an illegal
activity. 183 Second, the governmental interest must be
175
176

Id. at 476.
Id.

177 Kerri L. Keller, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly: The Supreme Court Sends

First Amendment Guarantees up in Smoke by Applying the CommercialSpeech
Doctrine to Content-Based Regulations, 36 AKRON L. REV. 133, 138 (2002)
(explaining that First Amendment restrictions do not mean that regulations
cannot be imposed, but that the government must show, among other things, a
compelling
interest to restrict the speech).
178 Id. at 138-39.
179 See generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557 (1980).
Id.
181Id. at 561-62.
182 Id. at 588.
183Id.
180
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substantial. 184 Third, the regulation must directly serve
that
186
interest. 185 Fourth, the regulation must be narrowly tailored.
The tobacco industry had some success when asserting a
right under the Central Hudson test. 187 When Massachusetts
attempted to restrict the methods of advertising and marketing used
by the tobacco industry, Lorillard Tobacco filed suit questioning
the constitutionality of the regulation. 188 Massachusetts attempted
to preclude tobacco manufacturers from advertising within 1,000
feet of a school or playground, and placed strict regulations on the
189
location of both products and advertisements within a store.
When deciding this case, the Supreme Court paid little attention to
the first two prongs of the Central Hudson test. 19 While the Court
recognized that the regulation served the interest of the state, it was
the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test that proved to be the
"critical inquiry in th[e Lorrillard Tobacco] case." 19 1 The Court
held that while the state does not need to show that "there is no
incursion on legitimate speech interests," the Massachusetts
regulation "unduly impinge[d] on the speaker's ability to propose a
commercial transaction and the adult listener's opportunity to
obtain information about products."' 192 Regardless of the youth
smoking problem in Massachusetts and "the importance of the
State's interest in preventing the use of tobacco products by
minors," the regulation was not narrowly tailored and therefore
193
would not pass the fourth prong of the CentralHudson test.
Any suit brought against the food industry could have a
similar result as that of LorillardTobacco case. While there is little
question that the food industry's speech should be provided some
184

Id.

185

Id.

186 Id.

See generally Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
536-37.
189 See id. at 534-35.
190 See id. at 555-56.
187

181Id. at

191

Id. at 561.

192

Id. at 565 (emphasis added).

193
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protection under the First Amendment, the government also has
little difficulty showing that it has a strong interest in protecting
the health of young people.' 94 However, like in Lorillard Tobacco,
the third and fourth prong of the Central Hudson test would
potentially receive the greatest amount of attention by the Court
while reviewing a similar food industry case. Whether regulating
the food industry's advertisements would directly serve a state's
interest is questionable. Although the standard is not impossible to
overcome, since the Supreme Court allows a state to "justify [its]
restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and simple
common sense," 195 a state will also need to show a credible link
between obesity and advertising. 196 Finally, the fourth prong will
also require a strong showing on the part of the government;
although, the Central Hudson test does not require the "least
restrictive means," it does require a "reasonable fit between the
legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those
ends .... ,,197
DIFFERENCES
Although the similarities between tobacco and obesity
show the potential for parallel action, the differences that exist
between the two may prove decisive. First, unlike cigarettes, food
is a necessity in some quantity, while tobacco is "harmful when
consumed in any quantity.' 198 Second, regardless of the changing
attitudes towards obesity in the past decade, the fact remains that
194

In Lorillard Tobacco, none of the petitioners contested the state's interest in

protecting the health of youth, leading the court to quickly accept the state's
interest as valid. 533 U.S. at 555. A state could conceivably show a similar
uncontested interest in the health of its youth as it relates to obesity and food
advertisements.
195 Id.
196

Massachusetts's inability to show this link contributed to the Court finding

for
197 Lorilland Tobacco. Id. at 557.
Id. at 556.
198Richard A. Daynard et al., Private Enforcement: Litigation as a Tool to
Prevent Obesity, 25 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 408, 408 (2004).
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many people consume fast-food or junk-food, and because they do
so infrequently or in moderation, they avoid becoming overweight
or obese. 199 Multiple factors, other than food, influence a person's
weight. A person's exercise habits and genetic makeup, aside from
food consumption, might contribute to his or her issue with
weight. 200 Third, tobacco is directly linked to health problems.2 °1
While the links between tobacco and disease may not be strong
enough to produce
a "signature disease," the causal relationship is
20 2
undeniable.
Eating fast-food or junk-food has no direct effect, unlike
second-hand smoke, on other individuals. San Francisco was the
first city to enact a ban on smoking within buildings. 20 3 Asthma,
allergies, and the effect of second-hand smoke all figured into the
rationale for passing indoor smoking bans. 20 4 As discussed above,
tobacco and obesity both present skyrocketing health care costs,
but only tobacco harms individuals who do not willingly partake in
the product. Both of these factors make fast-food a more
"sympathetic" defendant than tobacco. The tobacco industry was at
one time relieved of any moral wrongdoing by the general
population; however, it eventually was required to pay billions of
dollars to state governments, in part because it falsely marketed a
product and denied the addictive nature of nicotine. 205 In many
respects, this indelibly changed the "sympathy" that the public had
towards the tobacco industry. Before "Big Food" can get to the
199Courtney, supra note 33, at 94.
200
201

Id.
Id.

202 Some diseases, such as mesothelioma, by their very existence can show

causal connection. Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in
Toxic Substances Litigation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 965, 997 n.137 (1988). While the

health problems associated with tobacco use may not rise to the level of a
signature disease, the scientific evidence of the health links are well established.
Id. at 997.
203 BORIO, supra note 12.
204 See Justin C. Levin, Protect Us or Leave Us Alone: The New York State
Smoking Ban, 68 ALB. L. REV. 183, 184 n. 5 (2004).
201 See generally Green, supra note 89.
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settlement stage, a number of other hurdles that differentiate it
from Big Tobacco must be cleared.
Possibly the largest difference between junk food and
tobacco is that "[c]igarette ...consumption by minors, as a result

of targeted advertisements, is illegal, and clearly affronts parental
authority and autonomy . .. [Flast-food does not have the same

legal consequences." 20 6 The illegality of underage smoking
pressured the tobacco industry to cease youth-targeted advertising.
The existence of the age limitation gave the tobacco industry less
credible arguments and less first-amendment protection. 2 7 Much
of the public outcry against tobacco stemmed from this particular
issue. 20 8 If the outcry was a result of the illegality of youth
smoking, then this fundamentally sets tobacco and food in separate
categories. However, if the public's outcry was due to the
perceived ethical violation of targeting children to buy products
that were bad for them, then tobacco and food may not be that
different. In the wake of the obesity lawsuits brought against
McDonald's, a study found that eighty-nine percent of a study
group did not support fast-food litigation; however, over half
(fifty-six percent) of the respondents thought that "fast-food
advertisers should not target children .

. ."

while "[thirty-six]

percent thought fast-food restaurants
should warn customers about
' 209
the risks of eating their food. ,
Whether the similarities between the tobacco industry and
the food industry are close enough to forecast some of the
regulations that potentially await Big Food is unclear. There are
numerous differences between tobacco and junk food, and it will
be these differences that must be overcome before it can be argued
that the food industry should be regulated in much the same way as
the tobacco industry.

206 Munger, supra note 1, at 478.
207
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209
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CONCLUSION
The harmful effects of obesity and tobacco use are
undeniable. 2 10 Combined, obesity and tobacco have caused
millions of deaths and cost hundreds of billions of dollars in recent
decades. 211 It remains unclear whether the similarities between the
tobacco industry and the food industry are close enough to forecast
the regulations that potentially await Big Food. In many ways, the
food industry is positioned similarly to tobacco in the 1960s. The
Surgeon General has expressed concern over the dangers 2of12
unhealthy food and the skyrocketing costs of obesity.
Furthermore, public opinion may pressure the food industry to
reduce its advertising to children. If public opinion shifts further,
the "frivolous" suits brought by obese people against the food
industry may begin to gain legitimacy. The legislature may start to
think of Big Food as a politically safe target to regulate through
legislation. Eventually, states may decide that the cost of treating
one-third of their population for diabetes is too expensive and may
begin to look for those companies "responsible"
so that they can
2 13
recoup some of their Medicare costs.
Reviewing Big Tobacco's past can serve the purpose of
acting as a template for anti-obesity advocates who wish to place
regulations on the food industry. While the story of tobacco may
not predict regulations, it can show pitfalls that occurred in early
tobacco litigation. By avoiding these pitfalls and adjusting the
strategies that were not successful against the tobacco industry,
action against the food industry may prove swifter and more
210 See e.g., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERV, supra note 28; Munger, supra

note 1, at 459 (citing The Surgeon General's Call to Action to Prevent and

Decrease Overweight and Obesity, § 1).
211 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Smoking
& Tobacco Use,
supra note 99.
212 Munger, supra note 1, at 459 (citing The Surgeon General's Call to Action to
Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity, § 1).
213 State action against the tobacco industry culminated in the MSA. See Patel,
supra note 40, at 626. Similar action could conceivable occur once states begin
paying for the exorbitant medical costs associated with obesity.
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efficient. It took half a century for the government to begin
regulating tobacco after the first studies identified it as a probable
cause of cancer. 2 14 The obesity epidemic has been steadily growing
for the past thirty years. 2 15 Without action, the harmful effects of
obesity on future generations are guaranteed.

214 BORIO, supra note 12.
215 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Overweight and
Obesity:

Obesity Trends, supra note 1 10.

